Fresh Evidence Only The Germans Among Our NATO Allies Are Pressing for The MLF

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN (R. Mich): I want to discuss with you this MLF requirement.

Secretary MC NAMARA: Yes.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: You said yesterday that we had no urgent military requirement for this MLF and that we are not trying to sell it. Well, Mr. Secretary, if we are not trying to sell it, who is, because I haven't discovered anyone that wants it except perhaps the Germans.

Secretary MC NAMARA: Oh, the Germans are very, very much interested in it. . . .

Mr. RIVERS (D. S.C.): Now, about the multilateral force, we ran into this at NATO.

Secretary of the Navy NITZE: If the other European countries in sufficient number desire it, it is the Defense Department's view that we should support it.

Mr. RIVERS: You don't have much support and acceptance of it. The only people who wanted it were the Germans. They helped us defend it. . . .

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN: Who is pushing it [MLF]?

Secretary NITZE: There is a very serious problem involved in the alliance. It revolves primarily around the Germans, but it involves other members of NATO as well, as to what the future relationship to strategic nuclear weapons will be. . . .

—House Armed Services hearings on the new defense program, released Feb. 18. Pps. 6975, 7268-9, 7390-1.

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The Bogey of An Independent German Nuclear Deterrent

MLF are the initials of multi-lateral force. This is the proposal for a nuclear armada to be manned by mixed crews from the NATO nations under their joint control. MLF is presented as an effort to meet European demands for a greater voice in the use of the nuclear deterrent. It is supposed to be the symbol of "interdependence" between the United States and its NATO allies, to provide a closer military and political integration between them. Yet, even before they agree to this plan, we have declared it non-negotiable at the new Geneva disarmament talks where it has become a major obstacle to any new agreement.

WEU Turned MLF Down

In the past four months, there have been two occasions on which to test sentiment among our NATO allies on the MLF. The first was the Paris conference Nov. 7 of NATO parliamentarians, which is a kind of Atlantic Community Congress. Its military committee turned in a report calling MLF "wasteful" and "superfluous" while the political committee also rejected MLF. The "consensus" of the meeting as a whole was against MLF and "full support for the plan seems to have been confined to the American and German delegations" (*The Times,* London, Nov. 8). The second occasion was on Dec. 4 in the Assembly of the Western European Union, which speaks for the inner core of NATO in Europe —Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg and Italy. Here an attempt was made to put the WEU on record for MLF. The strongest speech in favor of it was by West Germany's Foreign Minister Schroeder who called it "one of the boldest and most fruitful initiatives of the free world" (*Le Monde,* Dec. 5). The attack was led by George Brown, deputy leader of the British Labor Party. He called it "a multi-lateral farce." On this occasion, "the first time that the MLF proposal has come to a direct vote in an international body" (*The Times,* London, Dec. 5), MLF lost. Yet we ignore these views and insist at Geneva that MLF is a must. This is a strange way to practice "interdependence."

The Official German View

"It was a wise decision on the part of the United States to propose to its European Allies the establishment of a nuclear force on a truly multilateral basis as regards the possession and control of nuclear weapons. This proposal has repeatedly been interpreted as an attempt to meet the German wish for participation in consultations and decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, but to refuse Germany the right of actually using such weapons under her own national responsibility. These comments are well known in Germany, but they reflect a very narrow outlook. The decisive aspect of the project for a Multilateral Force is the chance it offers to make the use of nuclear weapons a common Allied responsibility. . . . NATO must be capable of employing nuclear weapons under conditions where their use is not a sign of despair, but is governed by military and political considerations."

—Von Hassel, West Germany's Minister of Defense, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic party, writing in Foreign Affairs quarterly, Jan. 1964.

The most interesting idea put forward by the new Johnson Administration at the outset of the Geneva talks was for a "freeze" on nuclear delivery systems. Essentially this asks the Russians to accept a position of inferiority in planes and missiles for the sake of putting a brake on the arms race. In this it resembles the limited nuclear test ban treaty, and rests like it on the view that "enough is enough," that the question of who is ahead in numbers of missiles or tests has lost much of its meaning when neither side can escape a devastating return blow from the other should either venture a first strike. The natural complements of a freeze on delivery systems would be an agreement against proliferation of nuclear weapons and an end to the production of more fissionable weapon material. But if we set up an MLF for NATO, the Russians may have to set up an MLF for the Warsaw Pact. As the power inferior in nuclear stockpiles

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and number of delivery systems, this could put them at a disadvantage if they were committed to freeze the production of both. Above all the MLF looks to the Russians (as it does to our reluctant Western allies) as the first move to put a German finger on NATO's strategic trigger, on weapons which could be used to threaten or make a direct attack on the Soviet Union.

Like That "BLF" in Cuba

These fears should not be too difficult for us to understand if we recall our own reaction a year ago when the Russians put what might be called a *BLF,* a bi-lateral force of some 40 medium range nuclear missiles in Cuba. We would have felt no less alarmed if these missiles, instead of being emplaced in Cuba, had been set up on a BLF force of submarines or surface vessels in the Caribbean. The MLF calls for a joint fleet of 25 ships with 8 Polaris each. The only difference in principle between the Russo-Cuban BLF and our MLF is that the Russians kept control of the warheads—there was no Cuban finger on the trigger—while the MLF is supposed to give the Germans a vote and a veto among the 15 NATO fingers on the MLF trigger. Indeed (see box below) they are asking us to give up our veto in return for some system of majority or "weighted" control in which the Germans, who are to put up 40% of the cost would have a correspondingly preponderant voice in running it. There is little doubt that most of our NATO allies would prefer to abandon the MLF for an agreement with the Soviets freezing the arms race in delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles, and putting a stop to the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Two related questions need to be disentangled to see MLF clearly. One is the problem of greater integration within NATO. The other is the problem of German access to strategic weapons. Many opponents of the MLF in NATO are for fuller discussion and consultation within the alliance. The problem of integration is at least as old as ancient Greece where the disparity in power between Athens and its allies (as between Sparta and its allies) tended to turn alliances into forms of empire. The tremendous power of nuclear weapons has given this problem new acuteness. The non-nuclear powers are as much satellites as allies; indeed NATO, like the Warsaw Pact, may be seen as a new form of imperialism. If we wish to ease this problem by consulting more fully with our allies and giving them a greater voice in the decisions which may mean life or death, this is no obstacle to world peace or to progress in disarmament. Indeed we might make more progress in this direction if we consulted all of them at this juncture instead of responding only to German wishes.

It is the other problem which spells trouble. It is this which must be examined. One way to start is with the familiar argument that unless some device like MLF gives the Germans a hand in a strategic nuclear striking force, the Germans will develop an independent deterrent of their own, as have the British and the French. But there are many reasons why such a course would be difficult and dangerous for the Germans. They have the technical capacity; they have the economic resources. But where would they test? Unlike the French and British they have no dependent areas in Africa or the Pacific. To test would be a violation of the test ban agreement which Bonn accepted so slowly and un-

Prophetic Remark A Year Before The Missile Crisis

"Under no circumstances should the Federal Republic create the impression that it cherishes the ambition of becoming the 'decisive' military power of continental NATO. Even less permissible would be any move to acquire armament which in itself gave rise to the impression that Germany was claiming parity with the Soviet Union. No government of the Federal Republic should therefore demand that the Republic needs 'the same weapons as the Soviet Union.' It is plainly absurd for the Federal Republic, looking over its shoulder at the Soviet Union, to demand strategic mass destruction weapons. For the Federal Republic to be equipped with nuclear missiles capable of devastating Moscow or Leningrad would inevitably provoke the Soviet Union in just the same way as the supply of nuclear missiles to Cuba would provoke the United States."

—Defense or Retaliation: A German View, by Helmut Schmidt, leading military expert of the Social Democratic Party, in the Bundestag since 1953, where he is a member of Defense Committee. Praeger, 1962.

Rusk's Evasive Reply to German Demand U.S. Relinquish Veto Over The MLF

"On the MLF, Defense Minister von Hassel said that in the beginning the other partners must concede the veto power of the American President. As soon as the MLF becomes a military reality, however, it should be able to persuade the American partner to give up his veto and to establish majority rule for the political and military use of this force. . . . 'We must show consideration for the French, who will never join this force if its effectiveness can be blunted by the veto of one state. Whether to have a veto or majority rule, will first come up for decision when this military instrument becomes a reality.'

"Von Hassel believes that the political worth of the MLF should be seen in the strong binding together of American and European interests. Until now the Atlantic Pact had excluded the nuclear type of mutual dependence. So NATO will be strengthened by the still tighter linking of America to Europe in an integrated nuclear politics. . . . 'Every speculation that the German side regards the MLF as a way of obtaining nuclear weapons for itself is completely misleading'. . . ."

—Interview at the close of the Ottawa NATO conference in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung May 25, 1963, and summarized by the New York Times, May 28, 1963.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, the West German Defense Minister has been quoted as saying that while West Germany would go along at the outset with a veto on the use of a nuclear fleet, that eventually the fleet would not be militarily effective if the U.S. veto remains. What is the U.S. position on this view?

A. Well, I would not wish to comment on a partial report of an interview or statement made by a Minister that I have not myself seen. . . . Now, if Europe at some stage organizes itself and makes arrangements by which it makes its voice heard collectively in these matters, then we can take that question up. But, under present circumstances, I feel quite confident that in these nuclear matters, the U.S. must participate in the decisions.

—Secretary Rusk's Press Conference, May 29, 1963.

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willingly. To produce nuclear weapons on German soil would be a violation of the pledge given by Adenauer in 1954, a pledge embodied in the Western European Treaty of that year and enforcible by its Arms Control Agency. The anger and alarm would be as great in Western as in Eastern Europe if Germany were to set out on this path; it would be seen that the Germans once again, as in 1914 on Belgium, were treating their treaty obligations as scraps of paper; it would be a signal that war was coming.

Again War on Two Fronts

Long before Germany could produce nuclear weapons in any significant amount, there would be time for East and West to draw together and stop the process. Germany would be faced again with the fatal error of its last two world wars —it would have to fight East *and* West. The balance of forces against her would be greater than before. *Germany's only hope of getting nuclear weapons is to do so under cover of NATO, and her only hope of blackmailing the East into recovery of her 1937 frontiers is as the spearhead of a Western coalition in which Germany plays a dominant role.*

From any other point of view MLF is as foolish for the Germans as for other West European peoples. If Germany fears that the U.S. veto and the nuclear stalemate have robbed the American deterrent of credibility, would the deterrent be any more credible if 14 other nations had the veto as well? If the U.S. might hesitate to destroy itself in a world convulsion because of some threat to Germany, is there any reason to believe that the British, the Belgians, the Dutch or the Danes would be any more ready to die for them? The MLF no more takes the place of an independent deterrent than NATO, but the price of such a deterrent would again be the isolation and defeat of Germany.

The MLF politically, whether with 15 fingers or 5 fingers on the trigger, is a comic strip contraption. Militarily, its

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To Unify NATO Or Split It Apart?

"The other European countries that have agreed to participate [in MLF] . . . are more likely to do so to keep an eye on Germany than because of strategic convictions. . . . If the influence of West Germany in the MLF becomes too great, neutralism may grow in Britain, Scandinavia and the Low Countries. . . . It is in nobody's interest—least of all West Germany's—to set in motion events that can only end with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West. . . . A divided country, which in the space of 50 years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not—in its own interest—be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy. We are encouraging tendencies we may later regret."

—Henry Kissinger in The Reporter, Mar. 28, 1963.

The German Socialist View Which Sees Disengagement As A Peaceful Solution

"The idea of easing the intractable situation in Central Europe by means of military readjustments and thereby making real progress toward the reunification of Germany was first put forward in 1952 by Dr. Pfleiderer, formerly an FDP [Free Democratic Party, a right-of-center big business party—IFS] representative in the Federal German Parliament and later German Ambassador to Belgrade. The idea attracted little notice at the time. . . . It was not until the Berlin Conference of 1954, when Sir Anthony Eden came out with the idea of a Central European zone of arms limitation and control that the idea first assumed international importance. . . . Eden later submitted a variant of his proposals to the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955. . . . When, two years later, the Russians seemed for the first time to be ready seriously to pursue these ideas, further consideration of them was obstructed by the Federal German Government. In the same year Hugh Gaitskell made a set of very far-reaching proposals . . . later worked out in detail by Denis Healey. These proposals related to Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. . . . They have also, after a lapse of time and with certain modifications become an ingredient of the German Social Democratic political platform. . . .

"In the autumn of 1957 the so-called Rapacki Plan was made known to the world. This at first confined itself to the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe. . . . The flat, uncompromising rejection of the Rapacki Plan and the refusal to contemplate any negotiations on proposals of a like nature must be regarded, even today, as a diplomatic failure on the part of the West. The German Social Democrats once again took up the idea of a zone of arms limitation and control early in 1959, and made it the subject of an independent and detailed presentation in November of the same year. . . . [calling for a nuclear free Central Europe with limited conventional armies but not conditioned on Germany leaving NATO or the Eastern States leaving the Warsaw Pact in the hope that easing tensions would pave the way for German unification—IFS].

"The military objections raised by the West against the ideas put forward hinge almost entirely on spatial requirements. Some people, for example, maintain that there would be too little room for NATO's strategic nuclear weapons to be adequately deployed or, alternatively, to be provided with sufficient area for forward protection. This objection smacks clearly of dilettantism; for, as far as Western Europe is concerned strategic nuclear weapons are stationed exclusively in the United Kingdom, and there is so far no intention of deploying them on the European Continent. The creation of a zone of control in Central Europe would not make the U.K.-based strategic weapons any more vulnerable than they are now. There is also no force in the general argument that NATO could not give up the 200-250 miles broad Federal Republic because the area available for maneuver would lose critically in depth. The Soviet Army stands today 60 miles from the Kiel Canal and 75 miles from Frankfurt. In future it would be 500-625 miles distant from these vital points; its tanks would not be stationed just across the Elbe but away to the east of the Vistula and the Bug.

"Whereas today the Soviet army need cross only one river in order to move forward into the Federal Republic, and whereas the exits from the Baltic are immediately exposed to attack by the Soviet ground forces, these would in future —together with the bases for their naval forces and seaborne troops—be stationed very much further to the east. The Soviet army would have, in the event of war, three major rivers to cross, at each of which it would be exposed to the full force of interdiction at the hands of the Allied tactical air forces and medium-range missiles. By contrast the troops of the other NATO powers stationed in the Federal Republic would have to cross only one extra river, the Rhine."

—Defense or Retaliation, by Helmut Schmidt, military expert of the German Social Democratic Party (Praeger 1962).

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A Job Handling Liquor Is Hardly the Way to Cure An Alcoholic

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worthlessness is underscored by the various forms it has taken. Norstadt's first proposal was for a missile force mounted on barges and trucks on constant patrol in Central Europe; then somebody thought of the revulsion which would occur if in West Germany, Europe's most crowded area, one of them were to blow up accidentally; Germany would go neutralist overnight in the wake of such a mishap. Then it was proposed to have a fleet of Polaris submarines until Admiral Rickover and his friends let it be known that there would be a bitter fight before Congress allowed the secrets of the Polaris submarine to be given out so freely. The present plan is for a 25-vessel surface fleet; this is a grisly joke on the Germans since all other fleets are going underwater. These ships would be easy to spot, track and destroy.

The Deliberate Use of Monster Weapons

The MLF makes sense only politically. If it can become a mechanism for a tighter alliance with America against Russia, it is worth the $5 billion or more Germany's Defense Minister von Hassel figures it will cost. The Germans want us to give up our veto in MLF once it is operational; they are to pay the largest share of the European contribution to its cost and expect to have commensurate power in it. It is in this light that one must read von Hassel's ominous words in *Foreign Affairs* last January (see box on p. 1). "The decisive aspect of the project for a Multilateral Force," he wrote, "is the chance it offers to make the use of nuclear weapons a common allied responsibility. . . . NATO must be capable of employing nuclear weapons under conditions where it is not a sign of despair, but is governed by military and political considerations." This means the use of these weapons not in "despair" as a last resort but for "military and political considerations," i.e. as bargaining counters for military and political aims. This, for the Germans, means to blackmail Russia into restoration of their 1937 borders. These are the dangerous games into which Germany's dominant Christian Democrats and militarists would draw us.

MLF runs counter to all the hopeful elements in the military policies associated with Kennedy and McNamara. The tighter command and control they built up to prevent accidental war would be undercut by this dispersion of weapons and responsibility. Their effort to enlarge conventional forces in order to draw back from the brink and prevent escalation would be hampered by MLF. The $5 billion it would cost for duplicate missile facilities on vulnerable vessels will draw funds from conventional arms—NATO's real military need. Nor does it fit into the Grand Design of seeking a world settlement with the USSR; on the contrary, the very idea is enough (as we can see at Geneva) to serve the German goal of blocking any arms agreement until the Reich has its hand on strategic nuclear weapons. Most ludicrous of all is the notion that MLF will keep the Germans from going off on a nuclear binge of their own. MLF would give the Germans their first chance for training in the use of strategic nuclear weapons, their first chance to play with these monsters. Whoever heard of curing an alcoholic by giving him a job in a liquor store?

The Ideal Solution for Germany

"The ideal situation would be a Germany strong enough to defend itself but not strong enough to attack, united so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not encourage the rivalry of its neighbors, but not so centralized that its discipline and capacity for rapid action evoke countermeasures in self-defense. Such a Germany has existed only at rare periods. To help establish it must be a major task of Western policy. . . .

"As long as Germany remains divided, the danger of an explosion exists, whatever the wishes of the chief protagonists. Measures to control armaments in Central Europe, to be effective, should therefore accompany a political settlement. The natural dividing line for arms control schemes is the Oder, not the Elbe. The two problems of German unity and arms control in Europe are thus closely related. Unification without a scheme for arms control will frighten all the states surrounding Germany. A European security system without German unification is either a palliative or it will magnify conflicts in Central Europe."

—The Necessity for Choice by Henry A. Kissinger (Harper, 1961).

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